About the demographic pit and supermortality in Russia
"In 10 years it will be too late"
Sergey Rybalchenko
"Newspaper.Ru" publishes excerpts from the report "In 10 years it will be too late" prepared by the Institute of Scientific and Public Expertise.
It follows from the text of the report that in the worst case scenario, the population of Russia may decrease to 100 million people already in the early 2040s.
Despite the positive dynamics of the birth rate, the crisis has not passed, and Russia is on the verge of new threats.
The fact is that in the coming years the country will face the consequences of a catastrophic decline in the birth rate of the late 1980s - early 1990s (the consequences of the so–called "demographic pit of the 90s").
It should be emphasized that we are dealing here with a demographic catastrophe that is completely unprecedented in scale, which Russia has not yet had to face. The decline in the birth rate in the 90s was much larger than even the demographic pit of the Second World War (see Figure 1.6).
In other words, the number of Russians who were not born as a result of the catastrophic decline in the birth rate of the late 80s - early 90s is several times higher than the number of Russians who were not born as a result of World War II.
The young generation born in the early 1990s is now entering the reproductive age - the smallest in the post–war period. Now the number of 15-year-olds in Russia is half that of 25-year-olds. In 10 years, the number of women in the active reproductive age of 20-29 years, who account for almost 2/3 of births, will almost halve, which will inevitably lead to a significant reduction in the number of births.
The Russian demographic crisis has two components. The first is a low birth rate, as noted above, and also, despite the rise in the birth rate, a decrease in the number of young women of childbearing age, which means the prospect of a decrease in the overall fertility rate. The second component of the upcoming Russian demographic crisis is an abnormally high mortality rate for an industrially developed country with an average income level.
The Russian mortality rate is very high by world standards; moreover, the problem here is not only in the aging of the population, but also, first of all, in the extremely high mortality of men of working age. Approximately one third of all excess deaths among the male population occur at the age of 30-70 years. If the situation does not change, then, according to WHO, out of every 10 young men who have graduated from schools in recent years in Albania, Syria or the Gaza Strip, only one will not live to retirement age, and in Russia - four.
Russia, being on the 44th place in the world in terms of GDP per capita, ranks only 145th in terms of life expectancy (life expectancy) of men, lagging behind dozens of incomparably poorer countries such as Tajikistan, Yemen, Pakistan, Bangladesh or Honduras. In a number of regions with a difficult demographic situation (Amur, Pskov, Sakhalin, Smolensk, Tver regions, etc.), the male GI is comparable to that in Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Senegal and is 58-59 years old, and in Komi-Permyak Autonomous Region, Chukotka and Tyva – 53-54 years, as in the least developed African countries – Niger, Benin, Malawi.
It will be almost impossible to fill the missing population even by extremely active stimulation of migration – all CIS countries (Russia's main demographic donors) faced with their "demographic pits" associated with the sharp decline in the birth rate of the 1990s. As a result, more and more small age groups will enter the labor market in the CIS countries in the coming years, which will lead to a significant reduction in the surplus of labor and will serve as a powerful factor in reducing the migration growth of the Russian population.
It is important to note that hopes for solving the demographic crisis in Russia solely through migration are not justified. Compatriots living abroad have a certain migration potential and represent a separate demographic reserve of Russia, but its role in the formation of migration flows should not be overestimated either – it is only a compensatory component.
Both the Concept and the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 606 of May 7, 2012 "On measures to implement the demographic policy of the Russian Federation" further increase the birth rate. The life expectancy (life expectancy) of Russians has reached record values for Russia; the Decree also provides for its increase to 74 years by 2018, which corresponds to the level of life expectancy in Hungary. In other words, the targets of the Concept and the Decree are quite sufficient by European standards.
However, in Russia, as our calculations have shown, achieving these targets will not be able to stop depopulation. The targets of fertility, mortality and migration provided for in the Demographic Policy Concept do not ensure the subsequent growth of the Russian population in the long term (see Figure 2.1).
Already after 2025, the population decline will resume: under the inertial scenario in the coming decades, if new measures are not taken to support fertility and prevent mortality, the population will decrease to 140 million people by 2020 and to 113 million by 2050. Calculations show that while maintaining the current levels of fertility (well below the level of reproduction) and mortality (very high by world standards), despite the improvements achieved, in the coming decades the population of Russia will rapidly fall – to 138.5 million people by 2020 and to 112.4 million by 2050.
If the inertial scenario is implemented, the reduction in the population of Russia and the upcoming change in its age structure in the coming years will affect all aspects of the socio-economic development of the country.
Labor and economic potential. If the most urgent and serious measures are not taken to completely eliminate the Russian supermortality and increase the birth rate, Russia will face a colossal reduction in the working–age population – by 7-8 million people by 2020, and by more than 26 million people by 2050. The age structure of the economically active population will age significantly, which will jeopardize the planned rates of economic growth, investment attractiveness and structural modernization of the economy.
Personnel policy. Industries directly related to the prospects for modernization, such as industrial production and engineering, will suffer the most. Senior cadres will start dropping out of them in the near future. The shortage of personnel, if necessary, the growth of an economy based on innovation, can lead to the fact that the oil and gas industry and finance will remain prosperous, where a high level of wages will remain, capable of attracting a few highly educated young people.
Health and social security. The growth of the population of older ages will lead to an increase in government spending on medical care, since in older generations the volume of consumption of medical care per person is significantly higher than average. In addition, the rapid growth in the need for specialized medical care will require changes in the specialization of doctors and their training. The need for emergency medical care and comprehensive social service centers for the elderly will increase.
Education. A decrease in the contingent of Russian students will lead to a reduction in vocational education institutions if compensating forms of educational and educational-labor migration are not found. With high demand for higher education, the demand for secondary and primary vocational education institutions will decrease. The aging of the workforce will require the creation of a new modern system of continuing education aimed at retraining and retraining.
Pension provision. Problems will also arise in the state pension system, since the ratio of the working-age and disabled population from the current level of 2.7:1 may fall below 2:1 by 2035, and by 2050 it will be 1.6:143. Subject to unchanged taxation and the level of retirement age, the price of inaction in the field of pension provision can be determined as follows: the replacement rate will decrease from 36% in 2012 to 26% in 2030. Maintaining the replacement rate at the current level without changing the demographic situation and pension reform will cost about 0.2% of GDP an annual increase in spending.
Defense capability. Number of men of military age (18-27 years) it will decrease by 3.8 million people by 2020 (by more than a third), by 2050 - by 4.5 million (by more than 40%), which will cause problems with the recruitment of the armed forces.
Political risks. Political stability directly depends on the ability of the State to ensure social obligations. Destabilization and loss of trust in the authorities, in turn, can lead not only to a deterioration of the socio-economic situation, but also to an intensification of the demographic crisis according to the scenario of the 1990s with an increase in negative trends.
Geopolitical risks. A particular threat is the demographic situation in the Far East, where our neighbors are the three largest economies in the world (USA, Japan and China). Due to the low birth rate, high mortality and migration outflow, the population of the Far Eastern Federal District may decrease by almost 40% by 2050, to less than 4 million people. As a result, the territorial integrity of Russia as the largest single state in terms of area may be threatened.
Demographic challenges are such that if additional and effective measures are not taken today to mitigate the consequences of the demographic "wave" of the 1990s, then in the medium term the country risks losing economic growth and global competitiveness, and in the long-term forecast – social, political and geopolitical stability.
At the same time, it is obvious that the inertial scenario is by no means the worst.
Indeed, this scenario assumes that life expectancy in Russia until 2050 will still be at the level of 2010, and the total fertility rate will be at the level of 2011. At the same time, according to statistical indicators, 2010-2011 is by no means the worst (but rather, in terms of fertility and mortality, one of the best) in the entire post-Soviet history of Russia.
Unfortunately, there is no sufficient reason to be absolutely sure that the situation with fertility and mortality in Russia will not worsen any more. In recent history, there have been cases when, after some growth, the birth rate and life expectancy have collapsed to a level even lower than was observed in the years preceding the rise.
In a pessimistic scenario, we calculated the option of a demographic future in the event of the victory of the alcohol and tobacco lobby in Russia, a reduction in funding for family support measures, a return of mortality and fertility rates to the crisis values of the 90s, as well as an economic crisis, a catastrophic increase in unemployment, followed by a decrease in migration growth to zero by 2022.
Although this scenario seems too pessimistic, unfortunately, the proposals put forward recently – to abolish maternity capital, introduce paid services for young children in nurseries, increase kindergarten fees by two and a half times (by representatives of the middle class with two children) and freeze – reduce excise taxes on vodka and cigarettes, do its more real. The calculation results for this scenario can be seen in Figure 2.4.
Thus, in the worst-case scenario, the population of Russia may be reduced to 100 million people already in the early 2040s.
The author is the Director General of the Institute of Scientific and Public Expertise (INOE), Candidate of Economic Sciences, moderator of the working group "Family Policy and Childhood" of the Expert Council under the Government of the Russian Federation.
Portal "Eternal youth" http://vechnayamolodost.ru05.06.2014