Details of the creation of a deadly strain of influenza will not be published
Due to the threat of terrorism, the United States asks scientific journals not to publish flu research data
Denise Grady, William J. Broad, The New York Times, December 20, 2011:
Seeing Terror Risk, U.S. Asks Journals to Cut Flu Study FactsTranslation: InoSMI
For the first time in history, the advisory council under the Government appealed to the editors of scientific journals not to publish the details of some biomedical experiments, fearing that this information could be used by terrorists to create deadly viruses and epidemics.
In the course of experiments conducted in the USA and the Netherlands, scientists have created a very easily transmissible form of the deadly influenza virus, which is usually not transferred from person to person. This was a dangerous step, since such a light infection threatens to spread the virus around the world. Experiments were conducted on ferrets, which are considered good material for predicting what the flu virus can do to humans.
This virus, dubbed A(H5N1), causes avian influenza, which rarely infects humans, but which, in the case of such infection, leads to an extremely high mortality rate. Since this virus was first discovered in 1997, about 600 people have been infected with it, and more than half of them have died. Almost all of them were infected from birds, and most of the diseases were reported in Asia. Scientists are monitoring this virus, concerned that if it gains the ability to spread easily from person to person, the result could be the worst pandemic in history.
The Council under the government, called the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity) and working under the supervision of the National Institute of Health, asked the journals Science and Nature to refrain from including in research reports some details that they were going to publish. The Council stated that the conclusions and conclusions should be published, but it is not necessary to make public "details of experiments and data on mutations that allow reproducing such experiments."
The Council cannot force journals to censor their articles, but Science editor-in-chief Bruce Alberts He said that the editorial board would take these recommendations seriously and could withdraw some information - but only if the government creates a system for transmitting such missing information to scientists from other countries acting within the framework of the law who need it.
Journals, the council, scientists and government officials have been trying for several months to overcome the difficulties associated with the results of research. Dutch scientists presented their work at a virology conference held in Malta in September.
Scientists and journal editors are generally adamant in their desire to protect the free exchange of ideas and information, and are ready to fight anything that even remotely resembles censorship.
"I wouldn't call it censorship," Dr. Elberts said. "Rather, it's an attempt to avoid inappropriate censorship. The scientific community is trying to step forward and show responsibility."
According to him, there is a legitimate cause for concern due to the fact that the methods of work of researchers may fall into the wrong hands.
"Studies show that it is much easier to bring this virus to an extremely dangerous state when it can be spread by airborne droplets so that no one will know about it," he said. Spread by airborne droplets means that the virus can be transmitted through the air by coughing or sneezing.
After the tightening of security measures in connection with the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, scientists are concerned that scientific developments create a contradiction between the need to preserve information and the need to disseminate it. It looks like it's come to the fore now.
"This is a precedent–setting moment, and we need to be very careful about what kind of precedent we are creating," Dr. Elberts said.
The virus research, which is being conducted at the Erasmus Rotterdam Medical Center in the Netherlands and at the University of Wisconsin in Madison, is funded by the National Institutes of Health. The idea of the research is to try to understand what genetic changes can facilitate the transmission of the virus. Thanks to this, scientists will learn how to identify changes in the virus from the natural environment, which can be a warning signal about the development of the potential of a pandemic. There is also hope that research will help to better treat the sick.
Dr. Anthony Fauci, who heads the National Institute of Allergic and Infectious Diseases, said that these studies help solve important health problems, but added: "I'm sure there will be people who will say that these experiments should never have been carried out at all."
According to him, the staff of the institutes monitor the results of research and signal that the biosafety council should analyze them.
Ron Fouchier, a leading researcher at the Erasmus Center, did not respond to a request for an interview. The Center issued a statement in which it noted that scientists have certain doubts about the recommendations of the council, but they will implement them.
Yoshihiro Kawaoka, a researcher at the University of Wisconsin, is out of the country and "is not responding to calls and inquiries," a university spokesman said. However, he noted that scientists will "comply" with the recommendations of the council.
Biologist David R. Franz, who used to head the Army Biological Laboratory at Fort Detrick, Maryland, is on the board. According to him, the decision to intervene, taken in the fall, is very appropriate.
"I believe that we should not give non–professionals – and terrorists – information that would allow them to do something that could cause great harm," he said in an interview.
"This is an alarm signal," Dr. Franz added, "we need to provide our best and most responsible scientists with the information they need to prepare us for any possible surprises."
Amy Patterson, director of the Office of Biotechnology Activities at the National Institutes of Health, located in Bethesda, Maryland, said that recommendations of this kind appeared for the first time.
"The Council has looked at manuscripts in the past, but has never drawn conclusions about the need to restrict publications to any extent," she said in a telephone interview. "This underscores the importance of public health being prepared to monitor this virus."
A microbiologist from the University of Louisville and former chairman of the American Society of Microbiology, Ronald M. Atlas, who gave recommendations to the federal government on bioterrorism, said that the most difficult part of these recommendations is to create a system for promoting research in an environment where only a limited circle of trustworthy scientists will have access to information.
According to him, if scientists had a better understanding of how this virus works, they would be able to develop more effective methods of treatment and prevention of diseases. "That's what research is being done for," he said.
The government, Dr. Atlas noted, "will now find it difficult to decide how to provide information to the right people while maintaining barriers" to its wide dissemination in order to prevent such information from inadvertently falling into the hands of terrorists.
Given the fact that some of the information has already been openly presented at scientific meetings, and that articles containing such information have been sent to other scientists to receive feedback and reviews, experts admit that it is unlikely to be possible to keep potentially dangerous details secret.
"But I think there will be a culture of responsibility," says Dr. Fozi. "At least I hope so."
The Council was created in connection with the fears that emerged after the terrorist attacks on the United States in 2001 and the subsequent terrorist attacks with the use of pathogens of deadly anthrax, which led to the death and illness of 22 Americans.
The Bush administration demanded the creation of an extensive biological information control system capable of helping terrorists. But the scientific community firmly and stubbornly resisted such measures, arguing that the best protection is the free flow of information.
In 2002, Dr. Atlas, who had just been elected chairman of the American Society of Microbiology, publicly spoke out against "everything that looks like censorship."
The Federal Council was established in 2004 as a compromise measure, and it is exclusively an advisory body. It consists of 25 voting members appointed by the U.S. Secretary of Health and Human Services, as well as 18 members from other federal agencies.
Federal officials said on Tuesday that the council had only discussed information control measures three or four times. The first discussion concerned the genetic sequence of the H1N1 virus, which caused the 1918 flu pandemic, when up to a hundred million people died. It was one of the deadliest natural disasters in human history.
"We decided to recommend publishing the data without any changes," recalls Dr. Franz, "the more our respectable scientists know about the problems, the better they will be prepared to eliminate them."
According to the statements of federal authorities, this fall the council studied the contents of the manuscripts on H5N1 sent for publication in the journals Science and Nature, and at the end of November recommended that the editors of these publications limit information about the methods of modification of this deadly virus used by scientists.
"The ability of this virus to cross species boundaries in this way has not been given much importance before," said Dr. Paterson of the National Institutes of Health. "Now everyone involved in this work wants to do the right thing."
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22.12.2011